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Considering Restrictions on Genetically 
Engineering Humans 
Anna Zaret* 
In April 2015, scientists used a new genetic engineering tool known as CRISPR to edit the 
genes of a human embryo for the first time. CRISPR has made gene editing cheaper, 
more efficient, and more accurate than ever before. These advances in technology 
indicate that in the near future, technology will enable the genes of embryos to be edited, 
leading to the birth of the first “genetically modified human.” This Note explores the 
potential benefits and risks of editing embryos for reproductive purposes, and 
problematizes the lack of meaningful public regulation or deliberation in the United 
States on editing embryos. Given this risk of misuse, the United States needs to 
democratically develop regulations that ensure that the free market is not the only 
constraint on the practice of genetically modifying embryos. 
 
In order to demonstrate these points, this Note evaluates the potential beneficial uses for 
editing embryos, and weighs those benefits against the potential dangers of editing 
embryos. In discussing the dangers, it discusses individual health and safety risks, as well 
as societal risks, including the possibility that embryo editing facilitates a new type of 
eugenics. After evaluating the promises and perils of edited embryos, it discusses the lack 
of regulatory oversight of editing embryos in the United States, as compared to other 
technologically advanced countries. Given the lack of limits on genetically modifying 
embryos in the United States, and the dangers that editing embryos pose to individuals 
and society, thoughtful public policy discussion on how to regulate this technology is 
needed. This Note proposes several recommendations for how the law can help facilitate 
democratic discussion about whether, or under what circumstances, editing embryos 
should be permitted. Finally, this Note addresses two arguments that may be raised 
against regulation, and analyzes why neither of these arguments provide a strong reason 
to reject regulation. 
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A scene from the 1997 science fiction film Gattaca depicts a married 
couple’s decision to have their second child with the assistance of a 
clinician, who used the couples’ reproductive materials to create four 
embryos.1 The clinician edited the genes of each embryo to match the 
couple’s specificationsa boy with hazel eyes, dark hair, and fair skin.2 
The gene editing eradicated any potentially “prejudicial” conditions from 
the four embryos, such as premature baldness, myopia, alcoholism, 
propensity for violence, and obesity.3 Now, the couple has the option to 
choose which of the four embryos will ultimately become their future 
child.4 At one point, the couple questions whether editing the embryo has 
gone too far, and whether they should leave some of their child’s genetic 
traits to chance.5 The clinician pushes back against the couple’s concerns, 
telling them, “you want to give your child the best possible start, believe 
me we have enough imperfection already. Your child doesn’t need any 
additional burdens. Keep in mind this child is still you, simply the best of 
you. You could conceive naturally a thousand times and never get such a 
 
 1. Gattaca (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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result.”6 At the time of its release in 1997, Gattaca was likely dismissed as 
the fictional product of imaginative Hollywood minds. However, nearly 
twenty years later, the process of editing the genes of embryos 
(hereinafter “editing embryos”) is gradually becoming a reality. 
In April 2015, scientists used a new genetic engineering tool known 
as clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (“CRISPR”) 
to edit embryos for the first time.7 Gene editing using CRISPR involves 
altering the genetic sequences in an embryo.8 CRISPR could be used to 
eliminate genes from embryos that directly correspond to lifelong 
conditions, such as deafness.9 CRISPR could also be used to eliminate 
genes that have a correlation to diseases that arise later in life, such as 
eliminating the breast cancer susceptibility gene (“BRCA”) mutations 
associated with breast and ovarian cancer.10 In order to accomplish gene 
editing, clinicians need to pursue several initial steps, including: creating 
embryos using in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), analyzing the genomes of 
the embryos, and identifying embryos that have the specific monogenetic 
disorder (known as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, commonly 
referred to as “PGD”).11 Then, a clinician would use CRISPR to correct 
or eliminate the gene that causes the disorder in the embryo.12 Finally, 
the edited embryo would be implanted, and if successful, a pregnancy 
would ensue.13 
Any genetic alterations to embryos using CRISPR would also be 
passed down to future generations.14 This is because editing embryos 
involves making changes to germline DNA.15 Changes to germline DNA 
are permanent and heritable, meaning that an individual with these 
changes will pass them down to all of her genetically related children.16 
Thus, by using embryo editing to modify the genes of one’s child, you are 
also modifying the genes of your grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and 
so forth. Molecular technology has been used to conduct genetic 
modifications for decades, facilitating the rise of genetically modified 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear 
Zygotes, 6 Protein & Cell 363 (2015); see also David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists 
Genetically Modify Human Embryos, Nature (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-
scientists-genetically-modify-human-embryos-1.17378 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 8. Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 7. 
 9. Eric S. Lander, Brave New Genome, 373 New Eng. J. Med. 5, 6 (2015). 
 10. Zoë Corbyn, Crispr: Is It a Good Idea to ‘Uprgrade’ Our DNA?, The Guardian (May 10, 2015, 2:30 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/may/10/crispr-genome-editing-dna-upgrade-technology-
genetic-disease (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 11. Lander, supra note 9, at 6.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 7. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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organisms (“GMOs”). However, CRISPR makes genetic modifications 
cheaper, easier, and more accurate than ever before.17 With this new 
cheap and easy way to conduct genetic modifications, it is increasingly 
likely that embryos will one day be edited and used to create genetically 
modified humans.18 CRISPR has thus fast-tracked the potential for 
individuals to exercise a great measure of control over the genetic 
makeup of their future children. 
At this time, editing embryos using CRISPR has only been 
conducted for research purposes, as opposed to reproductive purposes, 
meaning that no edited embryos have been used to initiate a pregnancy.19 
Initial experiments using CRISPR to edit embryos demonstrated that 
such editing is currently neither safe, nor effective for reproductive 
purposes.20 Researchers predict, however, that technology like CRISPR 
will continue to be refined, eventually leading to the ability to 
successfully edit embryos for reproductive purposes.21 Just as other types 
of reproductive technologysuch as prenatal screening, in-vitro 
fertilization, and preimplantation genetic diagnosishave progressed 
from research to practice, so too could editing embryos. At some point in 
the not-too-distant future, technology will enable individuals to 
genetically modify embryos, implant those modified embryos, and to 
create the first genetically modified children.22 By the time science 
reaches this point, edited embryos could be in high demand.23 
The potential to use CRISPR to edit embryos and create genetically 
modified humans has sparked discussions on whether or how this 
technology should be used.24 For some, the desire to control our genetic 
 
 17. Heidi Ledford, CRISPR, the Disruptor, Nature News (clarified June 8, 2015), http://www.nature. 
com/news/crispr-the-disruptor-1.17673.   
 18. Id. 
 19. Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 7. 
 20. Liang et al., supra note 7; Lander, supra note 9, at 6. 
 21. Katrine S. Bosley et al., CRISPR Germline EngineeringThe Community Speaks, 33 Nature 
Biotechnology 478, 478–79 (2015). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 897, 935 
(2007) (citing public opinion polls from 1986 and 1992 that demonstrate that forty to forty-five percent 
of the American public approved of gene therapy to enhance physical and intellectual traits). Suter 
also noted that “[a]lthough genetic enhancement ‘may indeed be very far down the road,’ for 
technological reasons, ‘the potential demand may be so great that private companies may soon begin 
making a substantial commitment toward enhancement research and development.’” Id. at 934 n.195 
(citing Lori B. Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law and Policy 439–40 (2d ed. 2006)). 
 24. Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 7; Nathaniel Comfort, Can We Cure Genetic Diseases Without 
Slipping into Eugenics?, The Nation (July 16, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/can-we- 
cure-genetic-diseases-without-slipping-into-eugenics/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (contrasting CRISPR 
“liberals” and “conservatives”); see Marcy Darnovsky, The Perils of Human Gene Editing for 
Reproduction, Wash. Examiner (Mar. 8, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-
perils-of-human-gene-editing-for-reproduction/article/2585173 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Bosley et al., 
supra note 21; Erika Check Hayden, Should You Edit Your Children’s Genes?, 530 Nature 402 (2016); 
Lander, supra note 9. 
Zaret-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:30 PM 
August 2016]        GENETICALLY ENGINEERING HUMANS 1809 
future is a prospect too appealing to resist.25 But others worry that editing 
embryos may deepen inequality and create new types of injustices.26 
There have been ongoing debates about the ethical implications and 
legal rights surrounding genetic reproductive technology like editing 
embryos.27 Many who advocate for liberal use of embryo editing focus on 
the potential to eradicate diseases and improve human health by fixing 
“imperfections” in human genes.28 Some have suggested that editing 
embryos could be used to enhance complex human traits like intelligence.29 
Conversely, on the other side of the debate, individuals have raised 
concerns about editing embryos.30 At this time, health and safety risks of 
this technology preclude it from being used for reproductive purposes.31 
Many concerns about editing embryos, however, focus on broader ethical 
and societal implications of this technology.32 Editing embryos could 
exasperate inequality because only the economically privileged would 
have the financial means to access procedures for editing embryos.33 It 
could also increase discrimination by perpetuating stereotypes about 
which types of people are more or less desirable.34 Editing embryos has 
also been criticized as a new form of eugenics, because this technology 
 
 25. See e.g., John Harris, Why Human Gene Editing Must Not Be Stopped, The Guardian (Dec. 
2, 2015, 11:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/dec/02/why-human-gene-editing-must-
not-be-stopped (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 26. See e.g., Darnovsky, supra note 24.  
 27. Legal scholars have considered whether selecting the genes of one’s offspring is central to the 
constitutional right to procreate. See Andrew B. Coan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Select the 
Genes of One’s Offspring?, 63 Hastings L.J. 233, 240–46 (2011) (analyzing whether it would be 
desirable for courts to protect the right to select a child’s genes); John A. Robertson, Assisting 
Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1490, 
1506–11 (2008) (arguing that selecting genes is central to the decision of whether to reproduce); John 
A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 421, 422–23 (1996) 
[hereinafter Robertson, Genetic Selection]. Law Professor Sonia M. Suter has analyzed the ways that 
genetic reproductive technologies create a “neoeugenics.” Suter, supra note 23, at 898–901. Several 
philosophers and bioethicists argue that creating more perfect humans is a moral imperative once the 
technology can be effectively applied; see also Julian Savulescu, In Defence of Procreative Beneficence, 
33 J. Med. Ethics 284 (2007); Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Human 
Enhancement 11 (2004); Nick Bostrom, Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective, 
37 J. Value Inquiry 493 (2003). Other philosophers focus on the ethical problems raised by choosing 
the genes of a future child. See e.g. Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with 
Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, The Atlantic (Apr. 2004), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/04/the-case-against-perfection/302927/ (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016).  
 28. Harris, supra note 25; see Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 7. 
 29. Bostrom, supra note 27, at 493, Savulescu, supra note 27, at 248–88. 
 30. See Darnovsky, supra note 24; Comfort, supra note 24; Sandel, supra note 27; Tim Stainton, Missing 
the Forest for the Trees? A Disability Rights Take on Genetics, 13 J. on Dev. Disabilities 89 (2007). 
 31. Darnovsky, supra note 24; Lander, supra note 9, at 2–3.  
 32. Marcy Darnovsky, Human Gene Editing Is a Social and Political Matter, Not Just a Scientific One, 
The Guardian (Dec. 4, 2015, 8:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/dec/04/human-gene-
editing-is-a-social-and-political-matter-not-just-a-scientific-one (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 33. Comfort, supra note 24.  
 34. Darnovsky, supra note 24.  
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focuses on improving humans by perfecting or bettering human 
genomes.35 Those who hope CRISPR will one day be liberally used to 
improve genes do not see this similarity to eugenics as a problem,36 but 
others contend that a eugenic focus on improving human genes stratifies 
society and moves attention away from social problems.37 
Given the current safety concerns associated with embryo editing, 
professional organizations have considered what restrictions should be 
placed on such editing for research or reproductive purposes.38 In 
December 2015, an international summit brought together scholars from 
scientific academies in the United States, United Kingdom, and China, to 
discuss human gene editing.39 As one would suspect, a central issue of the 
summit was whether there should be limits on embryo editing.40 The 
organizers issued a joint statement at the closing of the summit, 
concluding that, if “human embryos or germline cells undergo gene 
editing, the modified cells should not be used to establish a pregnancy.”41 
In effect, this statement shut down embryo editing for reproductive 
purposes for now. However, the group also concluded that, “as scientific 
knowledge advances and societal views evolve, clinical use of germline 
editing should be revisited on a regular basis.”42 The statement thus left 
open the possibility of initiating a pregnancy using an edited embryo 
once gene-editing techniques become safer and more effective.43 As the 
science behind editing embryos inevitably becomes more precise, it may 
seem more appealing to researchers and the public. 
The statement adopted by the international summit on gene editing 
also demonstrates one of the only types of current restrictions on such 
editing in the United States: self imposed regulations by professional 
organizations. There are currently no laws in the United States that place 
specific restrictions on editing embryos.44 In contrast, forty countries have 
 
 35. See Comfort, supra note 24; Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics (2d ed. 2003); see also Robert 
Sparrow, A Not-so-New Eugenics, 41 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 32, 39–40 (2011) (discussing similarities 
between old eugenic practices and advocates of a “new eugenics” or “liberal eugenics” through 
autonomous use genetic technologies to enhance human biology); Tom Koch, Enhancing Who? 
Enhancing What? Ethics, Bioethics, and Transhumanism, 35 J. Med. & Phil. 685, 685 (2010) (arguing that 
using genetic selection technology to improve the lives of indivudals or society is “a new riff on the old 
eugenics tune”); Suter, supra note 23, at 923 (arguing that contemporary attitudes about reproduction 
combined with technological developments has moved back toward a new form of eugenics). 
 36. For example, Nick Agar embraces the concept of “liberal eugenics.” See Agar, supra note 27.  
 37. Comfort, supra note 24.  
 38. Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g, Med., On Human Gene Editing: International Summit Statement 
(2015); Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 Nature 410, 411 (2015). 
 39. Darnovsky, supra note 32. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g, Med., supra note 38. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See id.  
 44. See Darnovsky, supra note 32. 
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prohibited the editing of embryos by law.45 In addition, twenty-one 
countries have signed a binding Council of Europe treaty which prohibits 
editing embryos.46 The United States, however, notably declined the 
opportunity to sign the Council of Europe treaty.47 In addition, 
comparable countries that allowed embryo editing have, unlike the 
United States, enacted comprehensive regulatory systems governing the 
permitted uses of this technology. For example, while the United 
Kingdom does not have any laws outlawing embryo editing, it has an 
oversight body that specifically regulates the use of genetic reproductive 
technology.48 This oversight body is known as the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”).49 In February 2016, the United 
Kingdom’s HFEA decided to allow researchers to edit embryos for 
research purposes.50 HFEA’s approval of embryo editing in the United 
Kingdom demonstrates that before long, the researchers in the United 
States will want to join in on researching the editing of genes of embryos. 
But unlike the United Kingdom, no federal entity in the United States 
has the ability to conduct a meaningful analysis of the complex ethical 
questions and societal consequences involved in editing embryos. 
This Note explores the potential benefits and risks of editing 
embryos for reproductive purposes, and problematizes the lack of 
meaningful public regulation or deliberation in the United States on such 
editing. Furthermore, this Note argues that thoughtful public policy 
discussion on how to regulate this technology is urgently needed. A firm 
conclusion about whether, or what types of, genetic modification on 
embryos should be allowed requires a comprehensive evaluation that is 
too complex to be addressed here. Instead, the purpose of this Note is to 
show that the risks to individuals and the societal consequences of 
editing embryos call for democratic deliberation about how to best 
regulate this technology. 
Part I briefly evaluates the potential beneficial uses of editing 
embryos, and weighs those benefits against the potential dangers. In 
discussing the dangers, Part I examines individual health and safety risks, 
as well as societal risks, including the possibility that editing embryos 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 
Apr. 4, 1997, 4 E.T.S. No. 164 , http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 47. See Darnovsky, supra note 32; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 46. 
 48. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, c. 22 (U.K.); Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, c. 37 (U.K.); see Erik Parens & Lori P. Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public 
Policy: Reflections and Recommendations, Hastings Ctr. Rep. (Special Supp.) S15–S16 (2003). 
 49. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, c. 22. 
 50. Haroon Siddique, British Researchers Get Green Light to Genetically Modify Human Embyros, 
The Guardian (Feb. 1, 2016, 8:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/feb/01/human- 
embryo-genetic-modify-regulator-green-light-research (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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facilitates a new type of eugenics. After evaluating the promises and 
perils of edited embryos, Part II discusses the lack of regulatory oversight 
in the United States, as compared to other technologically advanced 
countries. Part II then proposes several recommendations on how the 
law can help facilitate much needed discussion about whether embryo 
editing should be permitted, and if so, under what precise circumstances 
it should be permitted. Finally, Part III discusses two arguments against 
regulating the editing of embryos, and explains why neither argument 
reasonably justifies the rejection of regulation. 
I.  Evaluating the Practice of Genetically Editing Embryos 
The first step in determining what role the law should play in 
regulating embryo editing is to evaluate the potential benefits and dangers 
of this technology. If used properly, editing embryos could potentially 
alleviate suffering and eradicate diseases. However, if misused, these 
genetic technologies pose risks to individuals and to society more broadly. 
This Part explains that the most commonly cited reason to pursue editing 
embryos is to eradicate diseases from future generations. It also discusses 
the potential “enhancement” benefitssuch as improving human traits 
like intelligence or life-span beyond normal measuresof editing 
embryos, which several commentators have proposed may one day be 
possible. After discussing potential benefits, this Part highlights three 
potential dangers of editing embryos. First, it will discuss individual 
health and safety risks. Second, it will discuss risks at the societal level, 
such as undermining social justice, equality, and inclusivity. It also 
emphasizes that focusing on genetic improvements to embryos, rather 
than improvements in social programs, may draw attention away from 
the social problems that shape health outcomes. Finally, it will analyze 
how genetic modification of embryos is a type of “backdoor eugenics,”51 
and emphasizes how many ideological assumptions from the American 
eugenics movement have been rearticulated today in arguments in favor 
of editing embryos. While this evaluation of benefits and dangers does 
not aim to be comprehensive, it serves as a demonstration of why 
deliberation is urgently needed to determine what role of the law in the 
United States should be with respect to editing embryos. 
A. Potential Benefits 
The most frequent justification given by proponents of embryo 
editing is that gene editing could reduce the possibility that children will 
be born with serious genetic diseases.52 Editing embryos has the potential 
to allow individuals to avoid passing on serious monogenic diseases, such 
 
 51. See Duster, supra note 35. 
 52. Lander, supra note 9, at 6.  
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as Huntington’s disease and Tay Sachs disease, which are caused by a 
single gene.53 There are roughly 3600 rare monogenic disorders caused by 
known genes, which could be eliminated from an embryo.54 Editing 
embryos would be most beneficial in situations when many or all 
embryos would be affected by a monogenic disease.55 This is because 
those with only a few affected embryos could still use existing 
reproductive technology to select an unaffected embryo.56 Individuals 
with many or all affected embryos, however, would not be able to easily 
select an unaffected embryo, and thus stand to benefit from being able to 
edit an affected embryo.57 
In addition to editing out rare monogenetic disorders, the process 
above might also be used to edit genes in embryos that correlate to a risk 
factor for common diseases, such as cancer, diabetes, heart disease, or 
multiple sclerosis.58 For example, an embryo might be edited to repair a 
mutation on the BRCA genes associated with increased risk of breast 
and ovarian cancer.59 These changes will be more difficult, however, 
because the genetic link to an increased risk of a common disease is often 
polygenetic, meaning that multiple genes, rather than a monogenetic link 
to a single gene, cause the increase in risk.60 Despite these challenges, 
some contend that editing embryos provides a uniquely promising way to 
eradicate and permanently increase resistance to diseases because 
changes made to one embryo will be passed down to future generations.61 
In addition to preemptively eliminating or reducing the risk of 
diseases, some believe that eventually embryo genes could be 
“enhanced” with other types of desirable genetic features that are 
currently not present or common in the human population.62 This so-
called “enhancement” use of editing embryos proposes to provide a future 
child with complex traits, such as athleticism or intelligence.63 Philosophy 
professor Nick Bostrom contends that technology like editing embryos 
should one day be used for “radical extension of human health-span, 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Corbyn, supra note 10.  
 60. Lander, supra note 9, at 6.  
 61. Harris, supra note 25. 
 62. See Corbyn, supra note 10 (discussing possible enhancement uses of gene editing); Antonio 
Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT Tech. Rev. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/ 
s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/ (discussing the views of enhancement advocates). See generally 
Bostrom, supra note 27; Savulescu, supra note 27; John A. Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical 
Case for Making Better People (2010) (for discussions by those advocating for genetic enhancement). 
 63. David B. Resnik & Daniel B. Vorhaus, Commentary, Genetic Modification and Genetic 
Determinism, Phil., Ethics, & Human. in Med. (June 26, 2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC1524970/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
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eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and 
augmentation of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities.”64 
Bostrom has also described genetic modification as the next step forward 
in human evolution.65 Julian Savulescu, also a philosophy professor and 
proponent of the enhancement of genes, argues that creating the 
genetically “best children” is morally required, an imperative that follows 
from the principle of beneficence.66 A group known as the “Genetic 
Virtue Project” considered whether embryos could be modified to have 
“virtuous” temperaments, such as a propensity for nonviolence or 
empathy.67 All of these discussions demonstrate that some believe that 
editing embryos could do more than simply improve health, by providing 
future generations with heightened physical and mental capabilities. 
While these visions of enhancement may sound appealing, the link 
between genes and complex traits like intelligence is largely unknown.68 
Any polygenetic link to complex traits would be difficult to establish.69 
This is because it is difficult to isolate the genetic component of complex 
traits, such as intelligence, from environmental and other factors, which 
often have no universal definition. In addition, editing embryos for 
enhancement purposes rests on a strong presumption of genetic 
determinismthe presumption that a gene or genes almost always leads to 
the development of a particular trait.70 This type of genetic determinism 
has been criticized as scientifically inaccurate because most genes play only 
a probabilistic role in determining complex traits, as environment and 
development play a large role in gene expression.71 In addition, many 
complex traits are socially constructed, rather than based in biology, 
making it difficult to conduct objective studies on how genes relate to 
these complex traits.72 While these problems demonstrate that it may not 
be feasible to edit embryos for enhancement purposes, a large portion of 
the public may be open to the idea.73 For many, genetic enhancement may 
 
 64. Bostrom, supra note 27, at 493.  
 65. See id. at 495; see also Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A 
Regulatory Framework for Trait-Selection Technologies, 19 Am. J.L. & Med. 187, 187 (1993). 
 66. See Savulescu, supra note 27, at 286 (arguing that the principle of beneficence requires 
individuals using IVF to choose the “best of the available embryos”). 
 67. Mark Walker, Enhancing Genetic Virtue: A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?, 28 
Pol. & Life Scis. 27, 27 (2009). The Genetic Virtue Project is an interdisciplinary project between 
scientists, philosophers, and doctors to enhance human ethics by finding, and engineering for, genetic 
correlates to “virtuous” behavior. See id. at 27–28.  
 68. Ulric Neisser et al., Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns, 51 Am. Psychologist 77, 96 (1996).  
 69. Resnik & Vorhaus, supra note 63 at 3–6. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Helen E. Longino, Studying Human Behavior: How Scientists Investigate Aggression 
and Sexuality 135–36 (2013). 
 73. See Suter, supra note 23, at 925 n.157; Rick Weiss, Cosmetic Gene Therapy’s Thorny Traits, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 12, 1997, at A1 (“Public opinion polls suggest that the demand for genetic enhancements may be 
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be the next step in giving children every possible chance at success. Thus, 
even if strong links between genes and complex traits cannot be 
established with scientific credibility, edits that involve even a slight or a 
purported chance of improving certain traits could become popular.74 
In sum, the strongest argument for editing embryos is that it could 
eliminate genes linked to diseases from future generations. Eventually, 
with increased knowledge about the correlations between genetic risk 
factors and improved accuracy in genetic modification techniques, 
embryos might be edited to reduce risk of common diseases. Some 
proponents also contend that technology like embryo editing will 
ultimately facilitate “enhancement” of embryos, by endowing children 
with nonmedical advantages, such as heightened intelligence. Scientific 
evidence linking complex nonmedical traits to genes, however, is lacking. 
Even discussions about whether the feasible medical applications of 
editing embryos should be carried out must involve a weighing of the 
potential benefits against the potential dangers. 
B. Potential Dangers 
There are at least four compelling reasons to consider regulating 
embryo editing for reproductive purposes. First, editing embryos poses 
serious health and safety risks.75 Second, allowing embryos to be edited 
involves societal risks, by potentially deepening social and economic 
inequalities.76 Forcing on the promises of editing embryos may also lead 
to undesirable societal consequences by moving attention away from 
social problems, and framing these problems as individual genetic 
problems.77 Finally, editing embryos potentially involves ideals from the 
American eugenic era by encouraging reproduction of good genes and 
discouraging reproduction of bad genes.78 The framework for evaluating 
whether to allow the editing embryos should focus on these dangers. 
1. Individual Health & Safety Risks 
There are many health and safety risks associated with editing 
embryos.79 Some of these risks will be removed through advances in 
science and technology, but others are inherent problems with embryo 
 
substantial. Surveys in 1986 and 1992 showed that 40 percent to 45 percent of the American public approved 
of the concept of using genes to bolster physical and intellectual traits.”). 
 74. Darnovsky, supra note 24 (contending that even if genetically modified children are simply 
purported to be more intelligent, that the social outcomes could be problematic).  
 75. Lander, supra note 9, at 6; id. 
 76. See Darnovsky, supra note 24; Sandel, supra note 27, at 57–58; Stainton, supra note 30, at 90; 
Koch, supra note 35; Suter, supra note 23, at 922–23.  
 77. See Comfort, supra note 24.  
 78. Id.; Koch, supra note 35, at 687; Suter, supra note 23, at 922–23. 
 79. See, e.g., Lander, supra note 9, at 6.  
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editing that cannot be obviated.80 Currently, the genetic editing of embryos 
for reproductive purposes is a risky form of human experimentation. 
Technical problems prevent scientists from editing embryos with sufficient 
accuracy and precision.81 For example, the first experiment on editing 
embryos involved problems with incomplete changes to targeted genes, 
inaccurate modification of genes, and unintentional changes to genes.82 
Each of these problems with making precise and accurate changes to an 
embryo’s genome would lead to devastating effects for a human.83 
Even once gene editing precision and accuracy improves, there will 
still be inherent risks in conducting gene editing on embryos. Scientists 
lack the ability to accurately predict all of the consequences of gene 
editing because edits to one gene can have unexpected consequences 
elsewhere in a genome that only become apparent over time.84 One 
instance of this arose when researchers conducting experiments on mice 
modified a gene to protect against cancer, but unexpectedly found that 
the modification also caused premature aging.85 It is also well known that 
genes that decrease the risk for one disease may also increase the risk for 
another.86 For example, genetic mutation that protects against HIV also 
happens to increase the risk for West Nile virus.87 These long-term health 
consequences of editing embryos may not be known until years after the 
edits have been conducted.88 
Editing embryos will simply never be risk-free. Mistakes are not only 
unavoidable, but also irreversible, because edited genes cannot be easily 
removed once present in the human population.89 While scientist may 
think they are making improvements in the genome, the improvements 
may actually create serious problems down the line. Even assuming the 
process of editing embryos becomes safer and more accurate, these 
inherent risks demonstrate that policies should be crafted to determine 
whether and how gene editing should be used on embryos. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 7 (citing Stuart D. Tyner et al., P53 Mutant Mice that Display Early Ageing-Associated 
Phenotypes, 451 Nature 45, 45–53 (2002)).  
 86. Id. at 6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Darnovsky, supra note 24. 
 89. Id.  
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2. Societal Consequences 
In addition to individual harms, there may be undesirable social 
consequences of editing embryos. First, editing embryos might increase 
intolerance of people with disabilities. Disability rights advocates have 
argued that reproductive decisions that aim to eliminate people with 
disabilities have a damaging effect on people currently living with 
disabilities. Second, editing embryos may perpetuate broader social and 
economic inequalities. Finally, by focusing too heavily on individual 
genetic problems, editing embryos may turn attention away from social 
problems more broadly. Embryo editing involves a powerful mix of 
technology and science, and the United States should consider whether 
regulation of such editing could potentially alleviate some of the 
dangerous societal consequences. 
Technologies like editing embryos have been criticized from a 
disability rights standpoint.90 Disability rights advocates and scholars have 
already pointed out how other types of genetic selection technologies, 
including prenatal screening and PGD, have allowed society to selectively 
eliminate people with disabilities, such as reducing the number of people 
born with Down syndrome.91 Similarly, editing embryos would allow 
people to eliminate future children with genes linked to disabilities. But 
unlike prenatal screening and PGD, editing embryos goes a step further by 
giving parents the power to eliminate disabilities from future generations. 
Several specific criticisms from disability right advocates, which have been 
raised about prenatal screening and PGD, also apply in the context of 
editing embryos. 
Focusing on embryo editing as a method for preventing disabilities 
before they occur may hinder attempts to restructure the world in a way 
that makes living with disabilities less burdensome.92 Focusing on embryo 
editing as a way to eliminate disabilities as a result places a burden on 
individuals to utilize that technology. Perhaps, instead of focusing on 
individual responsibility to eliminate disabilities, the focus ought to be on 
implementing strong public policies to eliminate the disadvantages that 
people with disabilities may face. In addition, many individuals have 
 
 90. Hayden, supra note 24 (discussing the impact of gene editing on communities living with 
genetic differences); Stainton, supra note 30; Eric Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights 
Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing Reflections and Recommendations, 29 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 
(Special Supp.) S1, S2 (1999). 
 91. See Renate Lindeman, Down Syndrome Screening Isn’t About Public Health. It’s About Eliminating 
a Group of People, Wash. Post (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2015/06/16/down-syndrome-screening-isnt-about-public-health-its-about-eliminating-a-group-of-people/ (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 92. See Tom Shakespeare, Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equality, 
13 Disability & Soc’y 665, 669 (1998). 
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misconceptions about what life is like with a disability, and those 
misconceptions shape the desire to avoid having a child with a disability.93 
Editing embryos potentially reinforces stereotypes about those 
disabilities by promoting the message that the presence of a disability 
necessarily means lower quality of life. Disability rights advocates have 
pushed back against this presumption, and even argued that some types 
of disabilities, such as high functioning Autism spectrum disorder, are a 
form of neurodiversity that society should embrace.94 
Decreasing the number of individuals living with disabilities also has 
an impact on the culture of people currently living with such disabilities.95 
If the numbers of people with disabilities decreases, so too will the 
number of resources dedicated to these groups. Moreover, some parents 
of people with Down syndrome have described being questioned for their 
decision to have a child with this trait.96 This experience demonstrates that, 
while today society largely treats disability as an immutable trait and 
product of chance, editing embryos could potentially lead to treating 
disabilities as the product of individual choice, which can be met with 
disapproval.97 Thus, editing embryos may lead to increased intolerance of 
people with disabilities the future.98 These concerns demonstrate that 
decisions about editing embryos are not simply isolated individual 
decisions. Rather, these decisions will affect many communities, including 
those with disabilities, if and when editing embryos is used to avoid certain 
undesirable genes.99 
In addition to the specific concerns raised by disability rights 
advocates, editing embryos has the potential to exacerbate already 
existing broader social and economic inequalities.100 The costs associated 
with editing embrysowhich is the combined cost of IVF, PGD, and 
CRISPRwould make it accessible only to those who are already 
economically advantaged. One round of IVF and PGD alone costs an 
average of $13,000–$16,500, and multiple rounds are often necessary to 
achieve a successful pregnancy.101 If the individuals who can afford this 
technology decide to make use of the opportunity to endow their 
 
 93. Parens & Asch, supra note 90, at S11.  
 94. Pier Jaarsma & Stellan Welin, Autism as a Natural Human Variation: Reflections on the 
Claims of the Neurodiversity Movement, 20 Health Care Analysis 20, 22 (2012) (discussing the 
neurodiveresity movement and its claims); see Suter, supra note 23, at 955–56.  
 95. See Suter, supra note 23, at 955 (discussing how defining “unfit” in terms of a disability “alone 
may devalue the lives of those with the trait”).  
 96. See Rachel Adams, “Didn’t You Get Tested?”, Salon (Apr. 28, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.salon. 
com/2013/04/28/all_the_ways_you_judge_my_son/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 97. See Suter, supra note 23, at 955. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 959.  
 101. Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), Reprod. Health Techs. Project, http://www. 
rhtp.org/fertility/pgd/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
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children with desirable traits, then undesirable traits may become more 
frequent among the more socially disadvantaged.102 Children with 
genomes edited to include desirable traits would become more frequent 
among those who already have the greatest advantages in society. 
It is also possible that rather than preventing serious genetic 
diseases, editing embryos will be developed and marketed for common 
nonmedical needs. While curing devastating, rare genetic diseases is 
incredibly important work, there is much more economic profit to be 
made in curing common inconveniences, such as male-pattern baldness 
or myopia.103 This focus on commercial uses for genetic technology is 
evident in a similar field, somatic (that is non-reproductive) gene transfer 
technology.104 In that field of research, “the focus of the field has shifted 
from rare genetic disorders, now viewed as offering limited profits, to 
more common ailments that promise greater financial gain.”105 A similar 
trend has been seen in the field of PGD reproductive technology. PGD 
began as a service for preventing serious and rare genetic diseases, but 
today PGD is increasingly being used to select a child’s sex.106 At least 
one clinic has openly advertised its desire to soon offer PGD screening 
for eye and hair color.107 This trend demonstrates that the original 
purpose of genetic reproductive technologiesto help individuals have 
healthy babieshas turned toward appeasing parents’ cosmetic desires. 
Instead of editing embryos to prevent serious health conditions, this 
technology could be used for endowing children with desirable cosmetic 
or nonmedical traits. The potential for embryo editing to be used for 
profits over health improvements demonstrates that leaving this 
technology unregulated in the free-market may lead to undesirable 
consequences from a societal interests perspective. 
Additionally, fixating on the potential benefits of embryo editing, 
especially for enhancement purposes, may put too much emphasis on 
improving individual biology and distract society from addressing 
aggregate structural problems. Proponents of embryo editing do not 
necessarily understand social intervention and genetic intervention to be 
mutually exclusive, but proponents often mistakenly treat genetic 
 
 102. See Comfort, supra note 24; Suter, supra note 23, at 959. 
 103. Mark S. Frankel, Inheritable Genetic Modification and a Brave New World: Did Huxley Have 
It Wrong?, 33 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 31, 34 (2003).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Elizabeth S. Ginsburg et al., Use of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Preimplantation 
Genetic Screening in the United States: A Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology Writing Group 
Paper, 96 Fertility and Sterility 865, 868 (2011).  
 107. Gina Salamone, Custom-Made Babies Delivered: Fertility Clinic Doctor’s Design-a-Kid Offer 
Creates Uproar, Daily News (N.Y.) (Mar. 4, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/custom- 
made-babies-delivered-fertility-clinic-doctor-design-a-kid-offer-creates-uproar-article-1.365959 (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016); Gautam Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles -- Hold the Colic, Wall St. J. (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123439771603075099 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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solutions as more universally promising than social solutions. Science is 
on a trajectory which overemphasizes behavioral studies at the individual 
level, rather than focusing also on the broader levels of groups or 
populations.108 For example, behavioral studies of aggression and 
sexuality mostly look at variation in distribution of individual 
differences.109 This approach misses the chance to understand variations 
in distribution “as effects of causal factors, such as physical environment 
or social structure, operating at the level of populations.”110 Similarly, 
scientists have tended to overemphasize the promise of what genetic 
research can explain or change about human behaviors, and because of 
this overemphasis, the public treats genetic research as more promising 
than social-environmental approaches in terms of their ability to improve 
human life.111 The public may certainly be fascinated with the potential to 
improve human genetics by editing embryos, but this fascination 
potentially overshadows important conversations about how to best 
improve society. 
Genes certainly play an instrumental role in biological health 
outcomes, but more frequently, public discussions focus on the potential for 
genetic technology to cure complex social problems. For example, social 
factors like access to education or exposure to violence are key determinates 
of heath, but no amount of genetic engineering can influence those social 
factors.112 Overemphasizing genetic change also overemphasizes individual 
problems, and creating a better society becomes an issue of addressing 
individual traits.113 The social conditions in which people live, which deeply 
affect individual choices and dispositions, become deemphasized.114 
Humans and societies are certainly capable of manipulation, but 
social programs like education, rather than improvements of genes, are 
critical to improving lives. This calls for developing effective institutions 
like education, health care, public safety, and other types of public 
services.115 Achieving social justice requires advocates to focus not only 
on individuals exhibiting certain traits, but also on developing institutions 
that can help lead people toward a fulfilling life and positive contribution 
to the community. Biotechnology can improve quality of life for some 
people, but genetic solutions are not the simple fix to complex social 
 
 108. Longino, supra note 72, at 135–36. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 136. 
 111. Id. at 135–36. 
 112. Comfort, supra note 24.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; Frankel, supra note 103, at 33 (pointing out that trait selection might lead to “less 
appreciation for productive social interaction in a classroom, for example, or for the hard work 
traditionally required to become a successful professional. These conventional methods of enhancement 
may have some intrinsic value that could never be duplicated by a genetic intervention.”). 
 115. See id. 
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problems. We cannot, as advocates of the liberal use of edited embryos 
suggest, pull levers to implement change for other people or societies; 
beliefs and social structures must also change. By perpetuating the belief 
that perfecting the human genome will cure many ailments of society, 
discussions of editing embryos also begin to sound remarkably similar to 
discussions raised in the eugenics movement. 
3. Relation to Eugenics 
One important critique of editing embryos involves how this 
technology relates to eugenics. Eugenics can be understood as both a 
historical social movement of practices, and a set of beliefs. The historical 
social movement of eugenics, which reached its peak in the United States 
in the early twentieth century, is most notoriously associated with forced 
sterilization policies.116 Eugenic beliefs aim at improving the genetic quality 
of the human population by encouraging reproduction of desirable genes 
or traits and impeding reproduction of undesirable ones.117 
Commentators have routinely discussed whether gene editing 
facilitates a new type of eugenics.118 Like eugenic beliefs, editing embryos 
rests on the presumption that some genes are more desirable to 
reproduce than others. In addition, editing embryos may also fulfill the 
goal of the eugenics movement by providing a high-tech method for 
“improving” human genetics. This shared presumption has led editing 
embryos to be described as “neoeugenics,”119 “backdoor eugenics,”120 and 
“liberal eugenics.”121 According to some, the similarities between eugenic 
beliefs and editing embryos demonstrates the dangerous societal 
consequences of engaging in this practice: bringing back eugenics.122 But 
others contend that these similarities do not pose a problem because, 
unlike eugenic practices, editing embryos does not involve state control 
over reproduction.123 To explain what is at stake in the debates about 
whether embryo editing is a form of eugenics, it is important to first place 
this debate in its broader historical setting, which will be done in the 
following Subpart. 
 
 116. Daniel J. Kevles, From Eugenics to Patents: Genetics, Law, and Human Rights, 75 Annals of 
Hum. Genetics 326, 327–28 (2011). 
 117. Id. at 327. 
 118. See, e.g., Comfort, supra note 24. 
 119. Suter, supra note 23, at 923. 
 120. Duster, supra note 35, at 129. 
 121. See generally Agar, supra note 27 (discussing the modification of embryos and comparing it 
to “neoeugenics” and “liberal eugenics”). 
 122. See Comfort, supra note 24.  
 123. Agar, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
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a. History of Eugenics 
Sir Francis Galton coined the term “eugenics” in 1883 to denote his 
theory of improving humans by giving “the more suitable races or strains 
of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.”124 
Galton studied whether selective breeding used in animals could be 
applied to improve humans by reproducing desirable traits and 
prohibiting reproduction of undesirable traits.125 In the early twentieth 
century, two concurrent intellectual developments helped propel the 
theory of eugenics into mainstream society: the rediscovery of Mendel’s 
theory of inheritance and the growing acceptance of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution.126 Flowing from the idea of natural selection, eugenic theory 
proposed that individuals or populations could be improved through 
intentional reproductive choices, by encouraging reproduction of 
desirable traits (“positive eugenics”), and inhibiting reproduction of 
undesirable traits (“negative eugenics”).127 Eugenicists used genetic and 
evolutionary theory to give scientific authority to deeply ingrained 
beliefs about natural rankings of humans held by those in power in order 
to rationalize maintaining the status-quo social order.128 
The transition from eugenics as a scientific theory, to eugenic public 
policy was a response to broader anxieties about how increased immigration 
would change the ethnic makeup of the American population.129 In 1905, 
President Theodore Roosevelt declared that, “race purity must be 
maintained” through promoting “more native white births.”130 President 
Roosevelt’s call to “improve” the genetic quality of the American 
population aligned with Anglo-Saxon America’s concern about 
immigration.131 Legislators used eugenics research on the “contamination of 
Anglo-Saxon genetic purity” to support the passing of the Immigration Act 
of 1924.132 This Act banned the immigration of Arabs and Asians, and 
severely restricted immigration of Southern Europeans, Eastern Europeans, 
and Africans.133 Eugenicists such as Harry Hamilton Laughlin also 
popularized eugenic policy by linking eugenics with economics and social 
 
 124. Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity 4 
(1985) (quoting Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences 
37–38 (MacMillan & Co. 1869)). As one might suspect from this quote, Galton’s theory of eugenics 
was also tied to his beliefs about racial, ethnic, and social hierarchies. Id. at 3. For example, he wrote 
about the heritable “intellectual inferiority” and “impulsive passions” of blacks. Id. 
 125. Agar, supra note 27, at 3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Suter, supra note 23, at 903.  
 128. Kevles, supra note 124, at 3–4. 
 129. Id. at 26.  
 130. Id. at 26 (citing Theodore Roosevelt, Address at the Lincoln Dinner (Feb. 13, 1905)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, http://www.legisworks.org/congress/68/ 
publaw-139.pdf.  
Zaret-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:30 PM 
August 2016]        GENETICALLY ENGINEERING HUMANS 1823 
inequality.134 Laughlin told audiences that the so-called “inferior 10 
percent” were “an economic burden on the 90 percent and a constant 
source of danger to the national and racial life.”135 Eugenic beliefs about 
natural inferiority of certain populations aligned with the political drive 
to enact immigration restrictions. Both eugenics and immigration 
restrictions served as a response to anxieties about the increasing number 
of people of color in the United States.136 
The early twentieth century also ushered in the dark turn toward 
eugenics’ most notorious policy: forced sterilization.137 Between 1907 and 
1963, state governments forcibly sterilized over 60,000 people under 
eugenics laws.138 In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld the practice of forced 
sterilization in Buck v. Bell, affirming Virginia’s compulsory sterilization 
policy that had led doctors to forcibly sterilize a seventeen year-old girl 
who was allegedly “feebleminded.”139 In the decision, Justice Holmes 
famously declared that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”140 
With that line, the belief that biology was at the root of America’s social 
problemsa view that had been decorated with all the trappings of 
scientific authority for a centurybecame a sound justification for 
violating the bodily autonomy and reproductive rights of tens of thousands 
of Americans. 
After World War II, the popularity of eugenic theory and policy 
faded as Americans became aware of its link to Nazi race science and 
genocide.141 While most American eugenic practices discontinued, the 
reality of sterilization persisted. The Eugenics Board of North Carolina 
continued involuntary sterilizations until 1974.142 Doctors in North 
Carolina sterilized an estimated 8000 people under its eugenics program, 
primarily targeting young women of color.143 Even as recently as 2010, 
doctors in California sterilized at least 148 female prison inmates, 
 
 134. Kevles, supra note 124, at 102–03. 
 135. Id. at 103.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). While the Court accepted Virginia’s description of Carrie 
Buck as a “feeble-minded” woman, researchers who followed up on Ms. Buck years after the case 
discovered that she was in fact a woman of normal intelligence. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s 
Daughter, 2 Const. Comment. 331, 336 (1985). For a detailed history on this case, see Paul A. Lombardo, 
Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and BUCK V. BELL (2008). 
 139. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Suter, supra note 23, at 915; see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (holding that a 
statute sterilizing habitual criminals violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Kevles, supra note 116, at 
329 (discussing growing opposition to eugenics in the United States).  
 142. Philip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in 1 Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal & 
Pol’y Issues in Biotechnology 205, 211 (2000). 
 143. Id. 
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primarily women of color, without obtaining proper consent.144 Thus, 
while states retracted eugenics polices, and public opposition to forced 
sterilization rose, eugenics never truly disappeared from the United 
States. 
This background helps clarify how editing embryos can be 
distinguished from past eugenic policy. Forced sterilization practices 
epitomized eugenic social policy during the early and mid-twentieth 
century. The eugenic ideology supporting this policy focused on defining 
traits as desirable and undesirable, and then weeding the bad traits out of 
society through forced sterilizations. While editing embryos does not 
involve state control over reproduction, it can be compared to eugenic 
ideology for facilitating reproduction of desirable traits and discouraging 
reproduction of undesirable traits. 
b. Overlap Between Gene Editing & Eugenics 
Tackling the question of whether editing embryos is a form of 
eugenics requires analyzing the similarities and differences between 
embryo editing and eugenics. The goal of editing embryos relates to 
eugenics because this technology involves improving individuals through 
voluntary reproductive choices. Editing embryos is, however, distinct 
from eugenics because individuals would be free to decide whether or 
not to use this technology, whereas a hallmark of eugenics was state 
coercion in reproductive autonomy. Those who advocate for liberal uses 
of embryo editing believe that the horrors of past state-imposed eugenics 
should not dissuade the public from embracing genetic modification 
because such modification would only result from autonomous choices.145 
Critics of editing embryos have pointed out that even if applied through 
autonomous choices, technology that facilitates eugenics can lead to 
serious societal consequences.146 In order to demonstrate these points 
 
 144. In 2013, a report revealed that forced sterilizations had taken place in California state prisons. 
See Corey G. Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisions Without Approval, Ctr. for 
Investigative Reporting, (July 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/female-inmates-sterilized-
california-prisons-without-approval-4917 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (reporting that “[d]octors under 
contract with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sterilized nearly 150 
female inmates from 2006 to 2010 without required state approvals”). Following this report, a 
California bill was passed into law that banned prisons from performing sterilization procedures on 
inmates without their consent. See S.B. 1135, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (amending the 
California penal code to prohibit sterilization of California inmates without first obtaining informed 
consent). 
 145. See Arthur L. Caplan, Editorial, Misusing the Nazi Analogy, 309 Sci. 535, 535 (2005) (arguing 
that eugenic principles of the past “have little to do with contemporary ethical debates about science, 
medicine, or technology”); see also Bostrom, supra note 27, at 499 (suggesting “[i]f parents had been 
left to make the choices for themselves, the worst transgressions of the eugenics movement would not 
have occurred.”). See generally Agar, supra note 27, at 5 (defending non-therapeutic uses of trait 
selection and calling human enhancement using reproductive technology “liberal eugenics”). 
 146. See Comfort, supra note 24. 
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further, the discussion below highlights the primary differences and 
similarities between eugenics and editing embryos. 
Embryo editing differs from eugenics in several key aspects. Perhaps 
most important, editing embryos is a distinct practice of improving humans 
through intentional reproductive choices, which does not involve state 
coercion or control. In the eugenics movement, states attempted to 
improve genetics through policies controlling over-reproduction, including 
forced sterilization. Conversely, individual reproductive autonomy is 
central to the editing of embryos, because private individuals will decide 
whether to edit. This distinction between the practices is critical because 
forced sterilization practices involved violations of basic bodily and 
reproductive rights. In that regard, the practice of editing embryos is 
nothing like past eugenic practices. Editing embryos does not infringe on 
basic bodily integrity or reproductive autonomy in the same way that 
sterilizing an individual without her consent does. 
Along those same lines, eugenics can be distinguished because 
eugenics focused on implementing policies at the state level, whereas 
embryo editing focuses on the actions of private individuals and 
industries. Eugenic policy facilitated eugenic beliefs through state laws 
preventing “undesirable” individuals from reproducing. In contrast, 
editing embryos for reproductive purposes would only take place 
through private actions or encouragement, not state policy. Private 
businesses would offer embryo editing services in the free market. 
Individuals would be free to choose whether to purchase this 
reproductive service. Further, rather than states mandating what traits 
are “desirable” or “undesirable,” individuals would make these decisions 
for themselves. 
Embryo editing also diverges from eugenic policies because this 
technology focuses more on improving individuals than on improving 
nations or society more broadly. The eugenics movement focused on 
improving genes in order to fulfill a greater goal of improving a country 
or humanity as a whole. Today, the development of embryo editing has 
focused on this technology’s potential to alleviate suffering for 
individuals in future generations.147 While one might point out that the 
arguments made by “enhancement” advocates do seem to extend to a 
greater goal of improving humanity, this argument has not been a central 
focus for those developing gene editing tools.148 Instead, embryo editing 
focused on improvements at the individual level. These distinctions could 
mean that editing embryos is not meaningfully similar to eugenics. But 
 
 147. See Frankel, supra note 103, at 31–32 (listing the most commonly screened for traits).  
 148. See Bostrom, supra note 27, at 502 (arguing that “an enhancement that has both significant 
intrinsic benefits for an enhanced individual and net positive externalities for the rest of society should 
be encouraged”); Sparrow, supra note 35, at 35 (noting that using trait selection on a widespread scale 
is still “contingent on the science advancing in certain ways”).  
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even those who advocate for liberal uses of gene editing have embraced 
the “eugenic” label, arguing that eugenic goals are only permissible if 
carried out through autonomous reproductive choices rather than state-
imposed coercion.149 This is because the desire to edit embryos 
undeniably reflects a type of eugenic belief in improving humans by 
improving genes. 
Although embryo editing differs from eugenics for the reasons 
discussed above, it still potentially facilitates eugenic beliefs. Embryo 
editing involves making intentional reproductive choices in order to 
improve humans by weeding out undesirable genes and reproducing 
desirable genes.150 This technology could potentially facilitate both positive 
and negative eugenics by enabling individuals to edit genes into, and out 
of, embryos.151 And by facilitating positive and negative eugenics, even if 
done through autonomous individual choice rather than state mandate, 
this technology hardens the lines between traits that are “desirable” and 
“undesirable.” 
The practices of embryo editing and eugenics share several 
assumptions related to defining “desirable” and “undesirable” traits. 
Like eugenics, embryo editing has been hailed as a way to alleviate social 
problems.152 This view shares with eugenics the assumption that social 
problems are caused primarily by individuals with bad traits, rather than 
by the structure of society. It further assumes that genes determine 
health and behavior, neglecting to recognize the role of social and 
environmental factors.153 In addition, like eugenics, embryo editing is 
premised on the assumption that desirable and undesirable genes can be 
identified. When individuals advocate for liberal use of embryo editing to 
improve humans, they assume that we can objectively know which 
human traits are desirable and would improve life, and which would 
reduce quality of life. Thus, embryo editing involves the same 
problematic assumptions as eugenics, by focusing too much on genetic 
determinism, and by perpetuating the belief that all traits are objectively 
desirable or undesirable. 
In essence, by focusing on “desirable” and “undesirable” traits, 
editing embryos involves making decisions about which traits make a 
 
 149. See Agar, supra note 27, at 3–16; see also Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 27, at 468 
(calling prebirth selection “a form of private eugenics” and arguing that trait selection should be 
protected as a form of procreative liberty). 
 150. Duster, supra note 35; see Koch, supra note 35, at 685 (arguing that using genetic selection 
technology to improve the lives of indivudals or society is “a new riff on the old eugenics tune”); Suter, 
supra note 23, at 923.  
 151. For example, as discussed in more detail infra at Part I, genetic modification could prevent a 
child from being born with Down syndrome, or it could create a child endowed with resistance to 
common diseases like cancer.  
 152. See Koch, supra note 35. 
 153. See Comfort, supra note 24. 
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human worthy of value.154 This technology, like eugenics, potentially 
perpetuates the belief that a person’s genes determine her value in 
society. Modifying an embryo to make sure that a child will be born with 
certain traits affirms the belief that people with those traits are the most 
desirable individuals to reproduce. Decisions about what types of people 
should be born involve many subjective beliefs about what makes a 
person “better” or “desirable.” However, practices like editing embryos 
have the potential to reify those subjective judgments, and make people 
believe that certain traits or types of people are universally, objectively 
undesirable or worse-off. The belief that people with certain traits are 
objectively worse-off is not only inaccurate, but is also problematic 
because it can lead to stereotypes and prejudices. 
Editing embryos could involve weeding out the same types of 
people targeted by eugenics. For example, eugenics targeted people with 
disabilities, and editing embryos would also likely be used to eliminate 
genes linked to disabilities. An argument raised by enhancement 
advocate Julian Savlescu also helps demonstrate how historically 
disadvantaged groups could be targeted by editing embryos. Savlescu 
argues that individuals are morally obligated to use technology like 
editing embryos to select the “best possible” children, which he defines 
as the children most likely to experience the least amount of suffering.155 
Historian Nathaniel Comfort has pointed out that if Savlescu’s argument 
is followed to its logical conclusion, it calls for creating the same types of 
people the eugenics movement sought to create. Those with the most 
chance of success also fall into groups that society privileges. Society 
currently gives the most opportunities to white, straight, men.156 Thus, if 
the goal is to create children that have the best chance of success, this 
seems to call for eliminating groups like people with disabilities, sexual 
minorities, and racial minorities. 
As this demonstrates, some of our assumptions about what is 
“desirable” historically, and still today, are grounded in discriminatory 
attitudes. In particular, people with disabilities, racial minorities, 
LGBTQ individuals, and women are most vulnerable to these 
assumptions. The traits, and consequently the type of people Savulescu 
argues should be edited out of the human genome, end up looking 
remarkably similar to the types of people that the eugenics movement 
sought to remove. Thus, if left unregulated, individuals may aim to give 
their children similar privileged status by editing embryos to fit into the 
categories of people that get the most opportunities in our society. The 
ability for editing embryos to provide a new, more efficient method of 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 151.  
 155. Savulescu, supra note 27, at 284.  
 156. Comfort, supra note 24.  
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putting eugenic ideology into practice demonstrates that the public needs 
to establish whether and how this technology can be responsibly used.157 
Thus, while the individualistic approach that enhancement 
advocates take is distinct from the eugenics movement, the assumptions 
underlying their beliefs are far from new. Although proponents are 
correct to point out how this technology is distinct from eugenics, the 
differences do not remove the shared ideological assumptions. The 
ethical concerns raised by these assumptions must be discussed in order 
to properly determine whether the potential benefits of this technology 
outweigh the potential harms. The history of the eugenics movement in 
the United States illustrates how encouraging “desirable” people to 
reproduce and eliminating the reproduction of “undesirable” people can 
become a dehumanizing practice. Thoughtful deliberation about how to 
manage embryo editing, including the possibility of regulation, can help 
clarify these and other serious concerns raised by this new uncharted 
technology. 
II.  Envisioning Oversight 
This Part first discusses how the United States lacks meaningful 
regulation of embryo editing. It describes the few limits placed on gene 
editing, including self-imposed regulations by professional organizations, 
state law, and federal oversight. To demonstrate the absence of 
regulation in the United States, this Part also outlines the regulatory 
oversight of research and clinical uses of embryos in the United 
Kingdom, and discusses the laws outlawing embryo editing in other 
countries. Finally, this Part draws attention to policies that ought to be 
considered, and highlights how these policies promote democratic 
deliberation on how to responsibly use the practice of editing embryos 
while not overburdening scientific progress. 
A. Current Regulation in the United States 
Reproductive technology has been described as the “wild west” of 
American medicine because of the absence of meaningful limits on the 
uses of these technologies.158 One reason for the lack of strong regulation 
is the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, a Congressional bill passed in 1995, 
which banned all federal funding for embryonic research.159 As a result, 
all embryonic research is privately funded.160 This is problematic because 
 
 157. See generally Comfort, supra note 24; Koch, supra note 35; Duster, supra note 35; Sparrow, 
supra note 35 (discussing the dangers of eugenic ideology slipping into the practice of editing embryos 
and society’s need to establish guidelines for responsible use of the technology). 
 158. See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (2008). 
 159. Parens & Knowles, supra note 48, at S11. 
 160. Id.  
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research conducted in the private sector is subject to less stringent 
regulations than publically funded research. 
The limited regulations covering genetic reproductive technology in 
the United States fall within three main categories. First, some 
professional organizations that research and develop clinical applications 
of genetic reproductive technology are self-regulated. For example, the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) sets standards 
of practice and ethical guidelines for IVF and related procedures that all 
members must follow.161 Around ninety percent of providers of 
reproductive services are members of the ASRM.162 Second, at the state 
level, some legislation has been passed to regulate assisted reproduction 
or aspects of embryo research.163 For example, New Hampshire and 
Virginia passed legislation regulating aspects of assisted reproduction.164 
Third, at the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
has jurisdiction over genetic experiments on embryos because these 
techniques constitute “products” analogous to other biotechnology 
products already within the FDA’s mandate.165 FDA oversight is limited, 
however, to issues regarding safety and efficacy.166 Thus, the FDA does 
not take into account the risk of social harms or threats to individuals 
that fall outside the scope of physical safety.167 In addition, the FDA does 
not limit off-label uses of drugs or technologies.168 If the FDA approves 
editing embryos for one purpose, it would not be able to prevent editing 
embryos for other purposes, because these uses would constitute “off-
label” use of embryo editing.169 In sum, none of the standing regulations 
can promote public conversation about the individual and societal issues 
that arise in the context of embryo editing. 
In comparison, the United Kingdom has taken a much more active 
regulatory role toward reproductive technology. In the United Kingdom, 
a previously mentioned federal organization, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), regulates genetic reproductive 
technology. HFEA oversees all research and clinical use of embryos, 
including genetic modification.170 The organization grew out of a 1984 
federal committee report on assisted reproductive technology and 
embryonic research, sanctioned in response to the emergence of new 
 
 161. See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Revised Minimum Standards for In Vitro Fertilization, 
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Related Procedures, 70 Fertility & Sterility 1S (1998). 
 162. Parens & Knowles, supra note 48, at S12.  
 163. See id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. In addition, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act requires fertility clinics 
to report information like success rates to the Centers for Disease Control. Id. 
 168. Darnovsky, supra note 24. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Parens & Knowles, supra note 48, at S15. 
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reproductive technologies at the time, including IVF, cloning, and egg 
donation.171 The committee report analyzed ethical issues involved in 
emerging genetic reproductive technologies, and then recommended 
adopting a federal system of regulation in the United Kingdom.172 
In 1990, the government adopted the regulations suggested by the 
committee report through the Human Fertilisaton and Embryology Act, 
and HFEA was created.173 Most members of HFEA have scientific 
expertise, but the regulation system also requires interdisciplinary 
membership and the input of interest groups.174 In addition to requiring 
diverse membership, HFEA also encourages democratic deliberation on 
reproductive technology policy by serving as a public information 
resource for patients and practitioners.175 Parliament updated the Act in 
2008, adding new rights and restrictions on genetic reproductive technology, 
and broadened HFEA’s regulatory power.176 The responsibilities of the 
organization include the licensing and monitoring of labs and clinics that use 
IVF, engage in embryo research, or store reproductive materials.177 HFEA’s 
licensing power is one of its most important regulatory functions.178 The 
organization has the power to determine which purposes the research and 
clinical applications of genetic reproductive technology may be used for. 
HFEA licensing focuses primarily on licensing for the purpose of research 
and practices, rather than licensing specific techniques. This distinction 
between purposes and techniques prevents regulation from being overly 
burdensome on scientific and technological development.179 
Indeed, while the United Kingdom has this comprehensive 
regulatory framework, the government remains committed to scientific 
freedom and has “one of the most liberal embryo research policies in the 
world.”180 For example, in 2015, HFEA allowed researchers in the 
country to use so-called “three parent IVF,” a type of germline genetic 
modification, to treat infertility and genetic diseases for the first time.181 
And, in February 2016, HFEA permitted a group of scientists to conduct 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at S16. 
 175. Id. at S15. 
 176. Some of the primary new elements of the Act included: (1) regulating the creation and use of 
all human embryos, regardless of how the embryos are created; and (2) banning sex-selection for 
nonmedical purposes. Id. 
 177. Parens & Knowles, supra note 48, at S15. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at S15–S16. 
 180. Id. at S16. 
 181. James Gallagher, UK Approves Three-Person Babies, BBC News (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/health-31594856 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see Darnovsky supra note 24, at 127 
(explaining how “three parent IVF” is a form of germline modification).  
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embryo editing for research purposes.182 These decisions to allow 
monitored cutting-edge research and clinical use of genetic reproductive 
technology demonstrate that public regulatory oversight of embryo 
editing does not necessarily impede development of this technology.183 
Instead, public regulation facilitates democratic deliberation about how 
this technology should, and should not, be used. 
B. Additional Regulatory Options 
The United States needs to find better ways to facilitate transparent 
discussions to evaluate whether, or how, editing embryos should be 
permitted. Given the risks to both individuals and society outlined above 
in Part II, three steps should be taken to promote public deliberation 
over the future research and clinical uses of editing embryo editing. 
First, Congress should consider revoking the federal ban on funding 
for embryonic research. Lifting the ban would allow Congress to invest in 
the necessary steps toward creating oversight of genetic modification 
practices. In addition, this move would acknowledge that the United 
States has already implicitly decided to support embryonic research by 
allowing the private sector to engage in this research without any 
restrictions. Responsible oversight begins with the acknowledgement 
that the United States is already deeply involved in researching potential 
uses for genetically modified embryos. Opening public funds would allow 
more regulatory oversight by entities already regulating government 
funded research. 
Second, Congress should create a committee to report legislative 
recommendations regarding possible formation of a statutorily created 
body, which would regulate research and clinical uses of genetic 
reproductive technologies, including the editing of embryos.184 This 
commission could consolidate relevant research and writing on the 
ethical considerations of engaging in research and uses of editing 
embryos. It should also solicit public opinions and input from 
stakeholders and expert constituencies that are impacted by this 
technology. The committee might consider framing recommendations in 
terms of permissible and impermissible purposes for editing embryos, 
rather than focusing on which techniques may be used for modifying 
embryos.185 By evaluating the purposes of editing embryos rather than 
the techniques, the regulations would be less burdensome on scientific 
progress. The public has an interest in encouraging public and private 
 
 182. Ewen Callaway, UK Scientists Gain Licence to Edit Genes in Human Embryos, Nature (Feb. 1, 
2016), http://www.nature.com/news/uk-scientists-gain-licence-to-edit-genes-in-human-embryos-1.19270 (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 183. Parens & Knowles, supra note 48, at S16.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
Zaret-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete)  9/8/2016 4:30 PM 
1832 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1805 
developers to invest in research that has promising potential for 
alleviating serious health problems. If research on promising treatments 
requires jumping through too many bureaucratic hoops, then researchers 
may focus their resources elsewhere. The recommendations can outline 
which purposes of editing embryos are impermissible, which would be 
allowed with increased regulatory oversight, and which require no 
oversight beyond the FDA. Furthermore, the commission should 
consider how to frame legislation such that it would not be too sweeping 
or reactive. Reproductive technology involves many important nuanced 
distinctions. Flexible regulation that is capable of adapting to changes in 
science and society will best fit the needs of these complex issues. 
Third, the commission should carefully consider the creation of a 
standing federal entity that would have authority over both the public 
and private sectors. The purpose of this entity would be to facilitate 
public and policy deliberation about research and clinical uses of embryo 
editing, including the social impacts and the risks to individual well-
being. This entity could resemble the United Kingdom’s HFEA, with the 
power to require and grant licenses, monitor facilities, set policy and 
quality standards, and engage in public consultation. Further, a primary 
purpose of this entity would be to encourage public conversations about 
editing embryos. In executing these functions, the agency should consult 
with all relevant public perspectives, not just the most powerful interest 
groups. To facilitate this, like the HFEA, a large portion of the members of 
the U.S. agency should work in industries other than medicine or science in 
order to prevent industry capture. Congress should consider hiring members 
that are women, people with disabilities, and people of color, as these groups 
have special concerns regarding genetic modification, but their voices are 
largely absent in the private development and use of this biotechnology.186 In 
addition, in order to guide the trajectory of the agency, Congress should 
frame the ethical principles it considers essential to inform the operation of 
the newly established regulatory agency. Such things could include 
protecting the well-being and health of children and families, promoting 
access to IVF for infertile couples, favoring embryo editing for medical 
purposes over enhancement, and promoting public access to information 
about embryo editing. The individual, societal, and eugenic consequences 
of editing embryos demonstrate that public policy discussion on how to 
regulate this technology is imperative. Deliberations will undoubtedly 
include many objections to regulation of embryo editing, many of which 
would focus on broader problems of regulating reproduction. Two of the 
recognized objections to regulation can be challenged by envisioning 
alternative frameworks for evaluating regulation of reproductive 
technology. 
 
 186. Suter, supra note 23, at 945. 
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III.  Objections to Regulation? 
Critics and proponents alike recognize the profound social 
implications that editing embryos raises, yet many still reject any form of 
oversight or regulation. Arguments raised against regulation usually 
reflect two interrelated concerns: (1) weakening reproductive rights and 
the ability to exercise procreative autonomy; and (2) politicizing science. 
A. Reproductive Rights & Procreative Autonomy 
Would increased regulation of editing embryos be a defeat for 
reproductive rights? Some of the political division that has hampered 
public action on embryo editing has been blamed on the debate 
surrounding abortion and other reproductive rights.187 Some reproductive 
rights advocates might worry that regulation of embryo editing, which 
restricts an aspect of reproduction, provides an opening for legal 
regulations of other aspects of reproduction, such as IVF, contraception, 
and abortion. Regulation of editing embryos raises alarms in the 
reproductive rights context because it threatens to chip away at female 
autonomy by taking choices out of the hands of women and families, and 
putting those choices into the hands of the government. Many in the pro-
choice movement are understandably resistant to policies that conflict 
with the choice and privacy framework of reproductive rights. The fight 
for bodily autonomy and the right to decide whether to have children has 
been hard fought. Regulations on editing embryos thus have enormous 
practical and symbolic significance, as any regulation on reproductive 
decisionmaking may be seen as a defeat for other reproductive rights. 
The cornerstone of this reproductive rights framework is that 
freedom of choice or autonomy is the most important principle in deciding 
what policies should be adopted regarding reproductive decisionmaking. 
This view can be described as a libertarian view of reproduction. Under 
the libertarian view, individual liberty supports individual well-being. So 
long as individuals are protected from governmental interference in 
reproductive decisionmaking, well-being remains protected. Under this 
view, restrictions on editing embryos should be limited as much as 
possible, so as to promote the principle of autonomy. This focus on 
autonomy in the libertarian view of reproduction, however, has both 
strengths and weaknesses. 
On the one hand, the libertarian view of reproduction is correct in 
placing a large emphasis on autonomy. Individuals, not the government, 
usually know what is best for themselves and their families. This is 
especially true with respect to deeply personal choices like the decision 
to have children. Moreover, the history of human reproduction in the 
 
 187. Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, in The Reproductive Rights Reader: 
Law, Medicine, and the Construction of Motherhood 308, 314 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008). 
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United States mainly involves infringement on autonomyfrom the 
forced sterilizations in the eugenics movement to the restrictions on 
access to contraception and abortion that exist today. The right to 
abortion has slowly become more constrained, and state laws have made 
access to abortion increasingly limited.188 Given the trajectory of 
reproductive rights in the United States, it makes sense to vigorously 
protect reproductive autonomy. 
But on the other hand, the libertarian view of reproduction’s 
singular focus on autonomy leaves little room for discussing the perils of 
editing embryos. In that respect, the libertarian view overemphasizes the 
value of individual freedom and neglects to recognize the impact that 
individual decisions have on future generations. Focusing on a libertarian 
view of reproductive rights “suggests a thin conception of autonomy and 
decisional privacy interests, which tends to minimize consideration of 
other social concerns.”189 Rather than focusing on isolated actions, the 
context of editing embryos, unlike other reproductive rights issues, calls 
for emphasizing how regulation might help promote greater equality and 
fairness. A libertarian view of procreative autonomy focuses “on our 
individual goals [which] dissolves community and divides us from each 
other.”190 The potentially dangerous societal consequences of editing 
embryos demonstrate autonomy is not the only value at stake in 
decisions about this technology. Thus, equating regulation of editing 
embryos to restrictions on other reproductive activities turns a blind eye 
to the unique nature of this technology. It also unnecessarily impedes 
meaningful public policy deliberations about how to handle this 
technology. 
Instead of a libertarian approach to reproduction, which focuses too 
heavily on autonomy, a helpful, alternative guiding principle of 
reproductive policy is the reproductive justice framework. Focusing on 
reproductive justice could facilitate thoughtful public policy discussion 
about editing embryos, while still emphasizing the concurrent need to 
protect the right to abortion and contraception. This framework values 
reproductive autonomy, but also values broader considerations about 
how public policy regarding reproduction can promote well-being, 
equality, and diversity. This framework emerged out of concerns raised, 
especially by women of color, about the “pro-choice” movement’s focus 
on issues that primarily affected white and economically empowered 
women.191 For example, Angela Davis argues that the pro-choice 
 
 188. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole M.D., No. 15–274, 
2015 WL 5169200, at *32 (2015) (discussing a Texas law restricting access to abortion).  
 189. See Suter, supra note 23, at 951.  
 190. Id. at 952 (quoting Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity 206 (1989)). 
 191. The pro-choice movement has also been criticized for “the politics of exclusion” experienced 
by women of color, the LGBT community, and the economically disadvantaged. Loretta Ross, 
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movement failed to address the concerns of working-class women and 
viewed abortion rights as an answer to “the myriad problems posed by 
poverty.”192 Davis points out that early reproductive rights advocates 
“assumed . . . that poor women, Black and immigrant alike, had a ‘moral 
obligation to restrict the size of their families.’”193 These biases crept into 
the reproductive rights movement and turned what was characterized as 
a “right” for the privileged into a “duty” for the poor.194 
In order to address these concerns, a reproductive justice framework 
refocuses discourse about reproduction on the institutional structures and 
the social and material conditions under which reproductive choices are 
made.195 Reproductive justice goals have been articulated as “creating 
better lives for women, happier families, and sustainable communities,” 
and allowing all people to “exercise the rights and access the resources 
they need to thrive and to decide whether, when, and how to have and 
parent children with dignity, free from discrimination, coercion, or 
violence.”196 A full realization of reproductive justice involves not only 
negative rights, such as being free from governmental interference, but 
also certain positive, basic human rights, like equal opportunity. The 
unregulated use of embryo editing potentially diminishes principles of 
reproductive justice because these technologies have the potential to 
exasperate inequalities and discrimination. This framework seeks to 
organize individuals and communities to actively engage with issues and 
have critical discussions about reproductive health and decisionmaking, 
without presuming certain policies to be the “only” correct answer. 
Reproductive justice focuses on “a view of reproduction as an activity 
that concerns all society” rather than viewing reproduction as singular, 
insulated, autonomous choices.197 
Unlike a libertarian view of reproduction, which seeks to keep all 
reproductive choices in the hands of individuals, a reproductive justice 
framework would not necessarily conflict with regulation of technology 
like the editing of embryos. This framework would neither be strictly for 
or against regulation. Instead, reproductive justice emphasizes that gene 
editing is an issue that affects all of society, and therefore warrants 
 
Understanding Reproductive Justice: Transforming the Pro-Choice Movement, 36 Off Our Backs 14, 
15 (2007). Reproductive rights scholar Rosalind Petchesky emphasizes in her feminist critique of the 
“choice” framework that “[the] conjuncture of medical, corporate, and state interests in the 
‘management’ of reproduction has defined the choices of all women, but in a way that is crucially 
different depending on one’s class and race.” Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Beyond “A Woman’s Right 
to Choose,” supra note 187, at 109. 
 192. Angela Davis, Racism, Birth Control, and Reproductive Rights, supra note 187, at 87. 
 193. Id. at 88. 
 194. Id.  
 195. What Is Reproductive Justice?, If When How, http://www.ifwhenhow.org/about/what-is-rj/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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 197. Davis, supra note 192, at 110. 
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democratic deliberation about how to properly regulate this technology. 
Given the broad society effects of this technology, reproductive justice 
advocates ought to engage in critical discussions about how editing 
embryos would impact the goals of reproductive justice. Importantly, the 
goals of reproductive policy should include not only the promotion of 
autonomy, but also of dignity, equality, and diversity. Rather than a 
singular “hands-off” approach to all regulation of reproductive activities, 
a reproductive justice framework allows advocates to weigh and balance 
the many implications that regulation would have on social justice goals. 
Under a reproductive justice framework, it is not inconsistent to be 
wary of state interference in reproductive decisionmaking, yet also 
interested in the public regulation of reproductive technology. For 
example, law professor Dorothy Roberts has emphasized that 
disadvantaged groups, such as women of color, are most likely to be 
harmed by public interference in reproduction issues.198 But Roberts still 
contends that “[t]he magnitude of harm that can result from unequal uses 
of [reproductive] technologies, an inequality rooted partly in racism, 
justifies government regulation.”199 Roberts’ perspective emphasizes the 
need to be aware of the dangers of regulating reproduction, but leaves 
open the possibility to craft regulatory policy in a way that aims to 
protect against those dangers. Policies that interfere with decisions about 
reproduction must be made with the utmost care given the United States’ 
history of eugenics and restrictions on contraception and abortion. While 
historical context is important to informing policymaking, a reproductive 
justice framework also supports public policy about reproduction, which 
focuses on “eradication of group oppression, and not just a concern for 
protecting the reproductive choices of the most privileged.”200 A 
regulatory system for overseeing the editing of embryos thus supports 
reproductive justice by promoting public engagement with how embryo 
editing impacts individuals, their families, their communities, and future 
generations. 
B. The Problem of Politicizing Science 
Another primary concern in regulating embryo editing is the 
potential to “politicize science.” The phrase politicizing science has been 
used by genetic reproductive technology expert Marcy Darnovsky to refer 
to the fear of mixing science and values. For example, when the Obama 
administration repealed restrictions on stem-cell funding established under 
President George W. Bush, President Obama promised to make sure that 
“scientific data is never distorted or concealed to serve a political 
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agendaand that we make scientific decisions based off facts, not 
ideology.”201 Darnovsky points out that President Obama’s statement 
assumes that “we want to insulate science from moral values and political 
commitments.”202 The real problem with policies like restrictions on stem-
cell research, according to Darnovsky, had nothing to do with politicizing 
science. Instead, progressives rejected restrictions on stem-cell research 
because the restrictions put corporate and religious interests over the 
interests of individuals who could reap health benefits from the research. 
Conservatives’ desire to regulate stem-cell research did not rest on 
inaccurate scientific beliefs; instead they focused on values with which 
progressives simply disagreed.203 By framing the stem-cell issue as an 
issue about keeping politics out of science, rather than deliberating what 
values should shape scientific policy, progressives “ruled social values out 
of order in science policy.”204 Similarly in the context of embryo editing, 
calls to keep the scientific progress outside the purview of politics rules 
out any opportunity to discuss how values can help determine how to 
responsibly edit embryos. 
One might also point out that politicizing science may be quite risky 
for disadvantaged groups. Michele Goodwin, a Professor of Law at the 
University of California, Irvine, has raised important concerns about 
whether any system of regulation of reproduction can be applied with 
equal respect to all women.205 She argues that historically, mixing 
regulation and reproductive technology has led to “inconsistent outcomes, 
unintended consequences, distributional unevenness, decreased utility, and 
economic inefficiencies.”206 Goodwin recognizes that scientific and 
reproductive policy necessarily involves values, but argues that using these 
values to shape public policy potentially “forces one group’s preferences 
on another, usually less-powerful group.”207 Thus, a critical problem with 
politicizing science is that lobbying groups that drive the legislation are 
often quite removed from those actually affected by regulations on 
reproduction. These political actors are often more concerned about the 
symbolic impact of legislation than practical effects.
208 
The concerns raised by Goodwin, however, should not lead us to 
take the potential regulation of embryo editing off the table. Instead, 
while policy surrounding the editing of embryos is debated, it is essential 
that democratic consideration be broadly inclusive of groups who will 
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feel the practical effects of laws limiting this technology. Rather than 
rejecting any connection between science and values, or between science 
and the state, we ought to consider what the appropriate relationship 
between these concerns should be. Decisions about editing embryos 
should be moved from the private realm to the public realm where they 
can be debated by the broader community. 
Darnovsky and others call this quest to involve the community in 
shaping the values of science policy “biopolitics.”209 The biopolitics 
framework contends that considering “social and ethical values in the 
course of crafting policy is not only appropriate, but necessary.”210 While 
consensus over which social and ethical values should shape policy will 
certainly be hard to come by, “disagreement about social and ethical 
values, or about how to apply them, is a necessary aspect of democratic 
political contestation.”211 Political conversations about editing embryos 
need to occur because these technologies involve a multitude of questions 
about social justice, common welfare, and medical and corporate 
accountability. Editing embryos provides enormous potential for 
scientific advances and medical improvements, but also enormous 
potential to deepen the social and economic divides that already exist in 
our society. Perhaps most importantly, editing embryos raises deep and 
profound issues about how to have a meaningful life and what it means 
to be a valuable human being. The answers to these questions shape how 
individuals see their commitments to others, and how they picture shared 
humanity communities. For these reasons, it is simply too risky to 
implement a “hands off” approach to any public engagement with 
embryo editing. Instead, we ought to engage in democratic deliberation 
to determine the appropriate relationship between regulation and the 
editing of embryos. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this Note is to point out that the risks of using gene 
editing technology on embryos for the purpose of creating a genetically 
modified child call for a deliberate and thorough public policy discussion 
on how to regulate this technology, and to suggest one way that oversight 
can take shape. The work does not end here, as Congress and public 
commentators must continue to deliberate the permissible purposes of 
editing embryos and the underlying values that regulation of this 
technology should reflect. In light of the absence of any regulatory 
mechanism to limit the use of embryo editing in the United States, one 
 
 209. See Darnovsky, supra note 201, at 38.  
 210. Id. at 37. 
 211. Id. 
Zaret-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:30 PM 
August 2016]        GENETICALLY ENGINEERING HUMANS 1839 
option that ought to be seriously considered is implementing a federal 
regulatory scheme to oversee the editing of embryos. 
As our country struggles with the implications of genetic discoveries 
that expand the potential uses of gene editing, we should not lose sight of 
the abuses and intolerances that can occur when eugenic ideologies 
become practice, even if only at the private level. Editing embryos has 
the potential to alleviate suffering, but also has the potential to intensify 
inequality and discrimination. We ought to embrace pursuits toward 
better health and happiness, but be skeptical of pursuits for creating 
perfect humans. While we struggle to protect women’s right to self-
determination and control over procreation, we must also keep in mind 
that we are entering a new era of reproductive technology that does not 
necessarily parallel the needs of women and families, but rather, follows 
private investors’ market predictions. Public oversight is the best way to 
encourage the necessary thoughtful deliberation over these issues, 
because reproduction is an activity that concerns all of society. 
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